












empirical	work	 concerning	 forced	migration	 associated	with	 the	 current	 Syrian	 refugee	 crisis.	 This	
work	is	directly	inspired	by	Alan's	work,	and	shares	his	ambition	of	contributing	to	a	pressing	policy	
challenge.	 In	 our	 model,	 which	 applies	 a	 spatial	 interaction	 framework,	 we	 examine	 the	 flows	 of	
migrants	 forced	 to	 leave	 Syria	 and	 the	 characteristics	 which	 influence	 their	 choice	 of	 destination	
country.	In	line	with	the	intuitions	of	the	broader	literature,	we	find	that	shorter	distances,	economic	
prosperity,	and	cultural	similarity	 (e.g.,	shared	 language	and	historical	 ties)	attract	 forced	migrants.	
Furthermore,	we	 find	 that	migrants	are	more	 likely	 to	 favour	 countries	 in	which	 the	probability	of	
being	 granted	 asylum	 is	 higher;	 a	 finding	 with	 potential	 implications	 for	 policy.	 Contrary	 to	












which	 is	 the	 field	 in	which	we	have	most	 closely	 collaborated.	We	 then	present	 the	 findings	of	 an	
original	 empirical	 study	 concerned	with	 the	Syrian	 refugee	 crisis,	which	 is	 inspired	by	–	 and	builds	
directly	upon	–	his	earlier	work	and	illustrates	the	diversity	of	subject	areas	to	which	his	approaches	
continue	 to	 be	 applied.	 	We	 start	 by	 reviewing	 some	of	 the	work	 in	which	Alan	 has	 been	directly	
involved,	discuss	how	this	inspired	our	work	on	Syrian	refugees,	and	then	present	our	findings.	
Between	 2010	 and	 2015,	 three	 of	 the	 current	 authors	 (Braithwaite,	 Davies	 and	 Johnson)	 had	 the	
pleasure	 of	 working	 on	 a	 large	 interdisciplinary	 EPSRC-funded	 project	 for	 which	 Alan	 was	 the	
Principle	 Investigator.	 	 This	 project	 –	 Explaining,	 Modelling,	 and	 Forecasting	 Global	 Dynamics	
(ENFOLDing)	–	sought	 to	develop	and	apply	mathematical	 tools	 to	understand	the	global	dynamics	
and	 inter-dependencies	 of	 four	 systems:	 trade,	migration,	 security	 (including	 crime),	 and	 overseas	





paper.	 	 We	 direct	 the	 reader	 interested	 in	 more	 details	 of	 the	 wider	 research	 conducted	 within	





clear	spatial	patterns	 (e.g.,	 Johnson,	2010;	Weisburd,	2015;	LaFree	et	al.,	2012).	 	 In	 the	ENFOLDing	
project,	we	explored	the	spatial	patterns	of	a	number	of	crime	and	security	phenomena,	at	a	range	
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of	 geographic	 scales,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 those	 which	 invited	 analogy	 with	 the	 other	 systems	 under	










series	of	studies	at	much	smaller	spatial	 scales	to	examine	whether	 the	spatial	pattern	of	 the	riots	
was	 random,	 as	would	 be	 expected	 by	 some	 perspectives	 (Le	 Bon,	 1960),	 or	whether	 there	were	
distinct	 spatial	 patterns.	 	 	 Our	 findings	 provided	 clear	 support	 for	 the	 latter,	 with	 there	 being	









relative	 to	 their	 home	 location,	 and	 a	 second	 employing	 a	more	mathematical	 framework.	 	 These	





These	 findings	 supported	 suggestions	 made	 elsewhere	 that	 the	 London	 riots	 had	 been	 largely	
acquisitive	 in	 nature,	 with	 looting	 a	 dominant	 driver.	 This	 invited	 a	 natural	 analogy	 with	 retail	
modelling:	 if	 rioters	sought	similar	rewards	to	shoppers,	 then	models	which	had	been	successful	 in	
that	 context	might	be	adapted	 in	order	 to	understand	 the	 large-scale	behaviours	of	 rioters.	Alan’s	
previous	work	in	the	retail	context	represented	a	canonical	example	of	spatial	interaction	modelling	
(Wilson,	 1970),	 one	 goal	 of	 which	 is	 to	 estimate	 flows	 of	 some	 quantity	 (e.g.,	 money	 or	 people)	
between	a	system	of	locations.	In	particular,	given	stocks	at	origins,	and	the	utility	characteristics	of	
destinations,	an	entropy-maximising	approach	can	be	used	to	calculate	the	most	likely	inter-location	
flows.	 Subsequent	work	 (Wilson,	 2008)	 showed	 how	 this	 approach	 could	 be	 combined	with	 other	
models	in	order	to	represent	evolving	flows	in	dynamical	systems.	
The	riot	scenario	could	be	framed	in	these	terms:	the	populations	of	residential	areas	constituted	the	
‘stocks’	of	potential	 rioters,	and	 the	utility	of	potential	 targets	could	be	modelled	 in	 terms	of	 their	
retail	volume	and	travel	distance.	This	was	combined	with	a	model	of	riot	involvement	based	on	the	
‘SIR’	 epidemiological	 paradigm	 (Anderson	 and	 May,	 1992)	 to	 produce	 a	 dynamic	 model	 of	 riot	
activity	across	the	city,	with	a	simple	model	of	police	activity	also	included	(Davies	et	al,	2013).	The	









$7	 billion	 per	 year	 (Ploch,	 2010).	 	 Our	 initial	 research	 thus	 aimed	 at	 describing	 patterns	 using	 a	
statistical	 framework,	 and	 in	 Marchione	 and	 Johnson	 (2013)	 we	 demonstrated	 that	 incidents	 of	
Maritime	Piracy	were	not	only	 spatially	clustered,	but	also	clustered	 in	 space	and	 time,	more	 than	
would	 be	 expected	 assuming	 that	 the	 timing	 and	 location	 of	 events	 were	 independent.	 	 In	
Marchione,	Johnson	and	Wilson	(2014)	we	built	an	agent-based	model	of	maritime	piracy,	using	the	
Gulf	of	Aden	as	a	case	study.		In	that	paper,	we	used	empirical	data	on	shipping	activity	to	model	the	
flow	of	potential	 victims	 (modelling	 the	activity	of	different	 types	of	 vessels	 from	different	origins,	
with	different	risks	associated	with	each)	through	the	Gulf	of	Aden,	and	developed	rules	–	based	on	
the	 available	 literature	 –	 to	 guide	 their	 behaviour	 and	 that	 of	 pirate	 (offenders)	 and	naval	 vessels	
(capable	guardians).	 	Methods	were	developed	to	enable	us	to	calibrate	 (with	one	sample	of	data)	
and	compare	the	model	outcomes	to	(a	different	sample	of)	empirical	data.		While	imperfect,	due	to	
missing	 data	 on	 naval	 strength	 and	 operating	 tactics	 (which	 were	 simply	 not	 available),	 the	 final	
model	 provided	 a	 good	 fit	 to	 the	 empirical	 data	 and	 provided	 insight	 into	 the	 phenomena	 and	 a	
framework	for	testing	naval	strategies.	 	Exemplifying	the	diversity	of	approaches	applied	within	the	
project,	 Marchione	 &	 Wilson	 (2016)	 also	 developed	 an	 alternative	 approach,	 using	 a	 spatial	






clearly	 influence	crime	and	security	 risk.	 	There	 is	 little	evidence	to	suggest	 that	migration	 leads	to	
crime	 in	 neighbourhoods	 (e.g.,	 Nunziata,	 2014),	 but	migrants	—	 particularly	 those	without	 formal	
documentation	 —	 may	 themselves	 be	 vulnerable,	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 their	 victimisation,	
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including	 trafficking,	 extortion,	 and	 exploitation	 (e.g.,	 Newell	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 	 Likewise,	 as	 will	 be	
discussed	 later	 in	 this	 paper,	 outbreaks	 of	 unrest,	 including	wars,	 can	 lead	 to	 the	 displacement	 of	





spatial	 interaction	 model	 to	 estimate	 the	 missing	 flows,	 using	 the	 distance	 between	 origins	 and	
destinations	as	the	key	parameter	of	the	model.		While	the	data	necessary	to	establish	the	“ground	
truth”	 for	 the	 entire	 system	 was	 not	 available,	 data	 for	 some	 countries	 (including	 the	 UK)	 were.		
Comparison	 of	 the	 SI	 model	 results	 with	 the	 UK	 data	 demonstrated	 a	 good	 overall	 fit	 for	 most	
countries,	with	R-squared	values	of	50%	or	more.	 	Further	analyses	suggested	that	the	exclusion	of	
inner	 London,	 which	 offers	 (for	 example)	 substantial	 job	 opportunities,	 improved	 the	 model	 fit	
further,	 indicating	 the	 role	of	omitted	variables	 in	migrant	decision	making.	 	A	 final	point	 to	make	
here	about	the	model	presented	 in	Dennett	&	Wilson	was	that	 they	show	how	 it	could	be	used	to	
produce	 predictions	 for	 the	 flows	 from	 the	 UK	 to	 all	 other	 countries	 –	 a	 modelling	 goal	 that	 we	
sought	to	address	in	the	work	we	will	discuss	next.					
As	discussed	above,	 three	of	 the	current	authors	were	successful	 in	acquiring	 funding	 from	the	US	
Department	 of	 Defense’s	 Minerva	 Research	 Initiative	 to	 develop,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 spatial	
interaction	models	 to	 help	 understand	 refugee	 flows	 from	 conflict	 zones,	 focusing	 on	 the	 case	 of	
Syria,	 in	 particular.	 	 These	 models	 were	 informed	 by	 and	 drew	 inspiration	 from	 the	 ENFOLDing	









the	Syrian	Civil	War	beginning	 in	2011	 (and	 still	 ongoing	 in	2019),	 these	 flows	will	 –	 as	with	other	
models	 of	migration	 –	 be	 comprised	 of	 people,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	millions	 of	 Syrians	 displaced	
around	 the	 world	 by	 the	 conflict.	 Where	 this	 scenario	 is	 distinct	 from	 others,	 though,	 is	 in	 the	
variables	expected	 to	explain	 the	 flows,	due	 to	 the	particular	 (and	extraordinary)	 conditions	under	









which	is	common	to	all	spatial	 interaction	approaches,	we	therefore	 include	an	explicit	 indicator	of	
contiguity.	Further	to	this	point,	refugees	would	also	be	expected	to	prefer	locations	where	there	are	
fewer	perceived	security	threats.		While	such	dangers	can	manifest,	and	be	measured	in	a	variety	of	
ways,	 some	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 issues	 relevant	 to	 the	 current	 paper	 are	 rates	 of	 conflict,	
terrorism,	and	crime.	
Although	 forced	 refugee	movements	 occur	 under	 highly	 constrained	 circumstances,	 the	 literature	
also	emphasizes	that	it	will	also	generally	entail	a	degree	of	choice.	That	is,	while	refugees	may	flee	
to	 the	 most	 easily	 accessible	 safe	 area	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 subsequent	 journeys	 to	 future	
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destinations	may	resemble	those	observed	during	other	forms	of	migration,	such	as	those	motivated	
by	 employment	 or	 family	 reunification	 (Collyer	 et	 al.	 2012,	 Davenport	 et	 al.	 2003,	 Zimmermann	
2009).	 As	 such,	 factors	 associated	 with	 voluntary	 migration	 –	 such	 as	 labour	 market	 conditions	
(including	 average	 wages	 and	 unemployment	 rates),	 the	 size	 of	 an	 ethnically	 similar	 diaspora	 (or	
colonial	 ties),	 and	 shared	 language	 or	 cultural	 similarity	 –	 are	 also	 relevant	 to	 refugee	 destination	
choices	(e.g.,	Thieleman	2003,	Bocker	and	Havinga	1997)	and	as	such	are	modelled	in	what	follows.	
We	also	expect	that	civil	liberties	and	political	rights	will	play	an	important	role	in	destination	choice	
(Fitzgerald	 et	 al.	 2014,	 Neumeyer	 2005,	 Moore	 and	 Shellman	 2006).	 Political	 rights	 include,	 for	
example,	the	right	to	form	political	parties	or	groups,	have	fair	elections	and	party	competition.	Civil	
liberties	include	the	right	to	free	speech,	freedom	of	the	media	and	the	prevalence	of	the	rule	of	law.	
Such	 liberties	and	 rights	are	 important	 to	 refugees	who	were	commonly	persecuted	 in	 their	home	
countries	and	wish	to	avoid	a	similar	fate	in	their	new	host	countries.	
Finally,	 we	 expect	 that	 the	 likelihood	 of	 being	 granted	 refugee	 status	 will	 be	 an	 important	
determinant	 of	 destination	 choice.	 Many	 states	 have	 publicly	 declared	 a	 willingness	 to	 observe	
international	 law	with	respect	to	non-refoulement	of	 those	who	seek	asylum	(Moore	and	Shellman	




In	what	 follows,	we	test	 the	 influence	of	each	of	 these	 factors	 (also	summarised	 in	Table	1)	briefly	








For	 this	 analysis	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 Syrian	 Civil	 War	 on	migration,	 data	 on	 the	 flows	 of	 official	
refugees2	from	Syria	are	taken	for	the	years	2011	to	2016	from	data	provided	by	the	United	Nations	
High	Commissioner	for	Refugees	[UNHCR].		It	is	worth	noting	that	these	data	exclude	those	who	are	
internally	 displaced	 within	 Syria,	 of	 whom	 there	 are	 at	 least	 6	 million	 people.	 	 While	 such	
displacement	is	an	important	component	of	the	forced	migration	phenomenon,	the	inconsistency	of	
data	 between	 this	 and	 the	 international	 component	 –	 the	 sources,	 and	 methods	 used,	 differ3	 –	
represents	 a	 barrier	 to	 their	 modelling	 in	 an	 integrated	 way,	 and	 so	 here	 we	 consider	 only	 the	
international	case.		Furthermore,	due	to	limitations	in	the	temporal	resolution	of	the	data	regarding	












having	 a	 nationality	 and	 being	 outside	 the	 country	 of	 his	 former	 habitual	 residence	 as	 a	 result	 of	 such	
events	is	unable	or,	owing	to	such	fear,	is	unwilling	to	return	to	it”;	or	





or	 define	 refugees,	 the	 sampling	 method	 applied,	 or	 the	 data	 used,	 the	 time	 period	 over	 which	 data	 are	
collected,	and	so	on.	
4	 We	 employ	 the	 most	 inclusive	 definition	 of	 ‘country’,	 as	 offered	 by	 the	 International	 Organization	 for	
Standardization’s	3166-1	 standard,	which	 is	 an	 internationally-recognised	 standard	 for	designating	 countries.	
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are	generated	by	 the	UNHCR.	 	However,	 from	those	countries	available,	we	excluded	a	number	of	
countries	(in	addition	to	Syria)	for	the	following	two	reasons.		First,	some	of	the	listed	territories	had	
very	 few	 (e.g.,	 Antarctica)	 or	 no	 (e.g.,	 Bouvet	 Island)	 residents	 and	 as	 such	 were	 not	 commonly	
referred	to	as	countries,	nor	expected	to	be	considered	as	destination	choices	for	those	fleeing	Syria.		
Specifically,	 63	 territories	 with	 populations	 of	 less	 than	 250,000	 (which	 collectively	 accounted	 for	
only	0.001%	of	all	 Syrian	 refugees)	were	 removed	as	possible	destination	 choices	 from	 the	model.		
Second,	 data	 were	 unavailable	 for	 one	 or	 more	 of	 the	 independent	 variables	 of	 interest	 for	 83	
countries.	 	Again,	 these	 countries	accounted	 for	 very	 few	Syrian	 refugees	 (in	 this	 case	0.2%	of	 the	
total).	 After	 these	 exclusions,	 102	 possible	 destination	 countries	 remained,	 with	 our	 dataset	
containing	 independent	 variables	 for	 all5.	 	 Cumulatively,	 these	 countries	 accounted	 for	84%	of	 the	
world’s	population	(excluding	Syria).		Figure	1	shows	the	cumulative	observed	flows	for	each	country	
included	in	the	analysis.	
Table	 1	 provides	 summary	 statistics	 for	 each	 of	 the	 variables	 analysed,	 a	 brief	 description	 of	 how	
they	were	derived,	and	their	provenance.		A	number	of	points	are	worth	noting.		First	is	the	fact	that	
distance	is	measured	and	tested	in	two	ways.	In	one	version,	it	is	measured	using	the	spatial	distance	




																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
	








definition	 (legal	 or	 otherwise)	 and	 its	 variation	 both	 between	 countries	 and	 over	 time.	Moreover,	
crime	 is	
